قالب وردپرس درنا توس
Home / Business / Are there any new dents in the capital's capital's armor? (Investment Ratings Analysis) – Main Street Capital (NYSE: MAIN)

Are there any new dents in the capital's capital's armor? (Investment Ratings Analysis) – Main Street Capital (NYSE: MAIN)



Focus in article:

Da Main Street Capital Corp. (MAIN) reported results for the fourth quarter of 2018, the company reported an attractive growth in quarterly net investment income ("NII"). However, along with wider sector and market trends, MAIN reported a net reduction in investment portfolio assessments in the fourth quarter of 2018. I gave some introductory thoughts on MAIN's quarterly performance in the following article:

My Expected Main Street Capital Q4 2018 NII Increase and Reduced Decline on Prerequisites for the Company

Within the linked article above, I gave a "broader" review of MAIN's financial results. As performed every quarter, I analyzed MAIN's investment portfolio fully from 1

2/31/2018 to determine which portfolio companies experienced a temporary decline in valuations only because of "spread widening" (reduction in comparable prices ) that affected the broader credit market against a more permanent reduction in valuations due to increased credit risk (higher likelihood that a portfolio company will not be able to meet its loan obligations in the future).

As such, this article focuses on performing the following two analyzes that provide direct evidence of the parent "health" of MAIN's investment portfolio: 1) an assessment of market values ​​("FMV") on the company debt and equity investments during the previous four quarters ; and 2) quarterly FMV percentage analysis of specific portfolio companies over the previous four quarters.

These analyzes have been and will probably continue to be very good forward-looking calculations to assess the future of MAIN's NAV sustainability. In addition, these analyzes provide evidence that portfolio companies are experiencing increased credit risk affecting the MAIN "non-accrual" rate and ultimately the company's taxable income ("ICTI") of NII / net investment company. Depending on the essentials of such non-accruals, this may ultimately affect MAIN's future dividend sustainability.

In the section "Conclusions drawn" in this article, I will include my projected MAIN NAV per share area for the next several quarters. I will also give my current BUY, SELL or HOLD recommendation and price target on MAIN.

Overview of income and value variations and the consequences for the MAIN NAV Sustainability:

Before giving the two analyzes mentioned above, let me first give some general examples of how MAIN's investment portfolio can have income and valuation fluctuations over time. Revenue fluctuations have a direct impact on MAIN's future dividend sustainability. Valuation fluctuations have a direct impact on MAIN's future NAV sustainability (with some variables "intertwining" ). I think giving some general examples would be beneficial to most readers.

Through generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"), quarterly FMV "write-downs" (also known as unrealized depreciation) or "revaluations" (also known as unrealized valuation) occur within MAIN's investment portfolio. Quarterly FMV fluctuations are also known as "mark-to-market" adjustments. These FMV fluctuations have an immediate and direct impact on MAIN's future NAV sustainability. When there is a market sale in the broader credit market (increased volatility experienced in the fourth quarter of 2018), typically spread spreads / base risks negatively affect bids for these types of investments. As such, this usually causes unrealized depreciation to be recorded for most of these types of investments.

However, if a portfolio company begins to see slowing down / worsening operations and / or net losses, it will be likely that FMV write-downs will occur in MAIN's debt investment due to a perceived increase in credit risk (reduction in expected discounted future cash flow / corporate value). This decline in value will occur regardless of broader sector trends. As such, the value of MAIN's investment portfolio will be reduced, resulting in an immediate decline in earnings per share ("EPS"). This happens even if the write-down is still unrealized.

Let us now assume that the same portfolio company is beginning to show signs of inability to pay its loan obligations (especially MAIN's debt investments). This would cause MAIN's debt investments in this portfolio company to be non-accruing (non-performance). When this occurs, interest income will cease to be accrued as / if interest payments are not received. As such, this will lead to an immediate decrease in MAIN's NII / net ICT and have a direct impact on the company's future dividend sustainability. This does not exclude the term "pay-in-stroke" ("PIK") / deferred interest income for simplicity.

These same general risks can also arise with regard to MAIN's equity investments. If a portfolio company (like MAIN has an equity investment) begins to see slow / worsening operations and / or net losses, MAIN's equity investment will generally be considered less valuable. As such, an FMV equity write-down / unrealized depreciation will occur. In a "worst case scenario" a total write-down will be required so that MAIN's equity investment is worthless. As with the debt investment example above, this will lead to an immediate decline in EPS. As such, this will have an immediate and direct impact on MAIN's future sustainable development. If a portfolio company (like MAIN has an equity investment) begins to show signs of inability to pay its loan obligations (either MAIN or to a third party), MAIN's equity investment in that company is likely to see a reduction in dividend income (where applicable). If this were to happen, there would be an increased likelihood that some or all of the cash dividends received by MAIN from the portfolio company would be considered a "ROI" ("ROC") per GAAP / "Internal Revenue Code " (" IRC ") and thus not part of NII / net ICTI. This will be determined by "Revenue and Profit" (the E&P; IRC term) for the underlying operating companies. As such, this will lead to an immediate decrease in MAIN's NII / net ICT and have a direct impact on MAIN's future dividend and NAV sustainability. As such, I think it is very important to continuously monitor a BDC's investment portfolio.

1) FMV Investment Rating Analysis on MAIN's debt and equity investments:

I believe that this analysis will give the readers a little more clarity to better understand how MAIN's investment portfolio was valued, in terms of valuations and credit risk, over the previous quarters. To begin this analysis, Table 1 is given below.

Table 1 – HEAD Investment valuation analysis as of 31.03.2018, 6/30/2018, 9/30/2018 and 12/31/2018 (Based on FMV, Includes cost basis as of 12/31/2018)

  Main Investment Assessment Analysis (Source: Table created by me, partly by MAIN data retrieved from SEC's EDGAR Database)

Using Table 1 above as a reference, I classify MAIN's debt and equity investments within one of the following three portfolios: [1] control (dark blue staining) ; 2) associated with (olive green color) ; or 3) non-control / non-associated (purple colors). A control investment is where MAIN owns (through an equity investment) on or over 25% of a portfolio company's outstanding voting securities. An associated investment is where MAIN owns (through an equity investment) at or above 5%, but less than 25% of a portfolio company's outstanding voting securities. Within these three ratings, five different investment ratings are shown based on each portfolio's latest FMV. I include four separate points in time to better highlight movements within each classification.

In my professional opinion, this specific analysis is a good measurement of the future for mapping potential portfolio companies that would be more likely to lose any principal and / or non-accrual. In addition, spotting certain past / latest trends within a BDC's investment portfolio provides extra insight into accurate and reliable projections in the future (which I believe I've continued to give to readers through periodic articles / analysis).

An investment assessment by "1" describes the portion of MAIN's debt and equity investments that exceeded expectations. An investment rating of "2" describes the portion of the investments that were close to expectations. An investment assessment by "3", "4", and "5" describes the portion of investments that performed slightly, modestly and substantially below expectations, respectively.

Regarding this analysis, I personally assign these investment ratings to each company's portfolio holders and are usually "tougher" per se in my reviews over most current management teams performing a similar analysis. In most cases, my personal grades ultimately provide a more accurate / clearer picture of a BDC's "health" at a given time in terms of credit risk / underperformance / eventual non-accrual.

Investment assessment 1 and 2 (Performing near, at or above expectations) :

Still using Table 1 as a reference, I have classified 84%, 84%, 82%, and 70% of MAIN's investment portfolio performs respectively expected 3/31/2018, 6/30/2018, 9/30/2018 and 12/31/2018 (based on FMV) respectively. As such, MAIN's investment portfolio experienced a relatively consistent / stable performance up to the fourth quarter of 2018. As mentioned earlier, there was greater market volatility due to increased spreads during the quarter. This was the main reason why various debt and equity investments were reclassified from an investment rating of 1 to an investment rating of 2 (a "cautious" factor / trend). As mentioned in the linked article near the beginning, a majority of the spread that occurred in the fourth quarter of 2018 already "reversed rate" in the first quarter of 2019. As such, I would not be too busy of the latest trend in these top two investment reviews. As of 12/31/2018, this investment assessment had an FMV of $ 1.72 billion.

I would also like to point out that I have classified 95%, 92%, 92% and 91% of MAIN's control investment portfolio that performs on or above expectations as of 3/31/2018, 6/30/2018, 9/30/2018, respectively. and 12/31/2018. When analyzing control investments, this percentage continues to be one of the highest out of the fifteen BDC girls I now cover. Simply put, this continues to be a very high percentage. I think this is one of the main reasons why MAIN's share price has continued to trade at a significant premium to most of its BDC counterparts.

I believe that the following MAIN control portfolio companies had substantially above expectations as of 12/31/2018: 1) Café Brazil, LLC (Café Brasil) ; 2) CBT Nuggets (even with the latest decline in valuation, tied more to cryptographic rates and not the underlying business model) ; 3) Gamber-Johnson Holdings, LLC (Gamber-Johnson) ; 4) GRT Rubber Technologies, LLC (GRT Rubber) ; 5) Gulf Manufacturing, LLC ("Gulf") ; 6) Harrison Hydra-Gen, Ltd. (Harrison) ; 7) Jensen Jewelers or Idaho, LLC (Jensen) ; 8) KBK Industries, LLC ("KBK") ; 9) MSC Advisor I, LLC (MSC Adviser I) ; 10) OMi Holdings, Inc. ("OMi") ; 11) Pegasus Research Group, LLC (Pegasus) ; and 12) River Aggregates, LLC (River Aggregates) .

Then I have classified 7%, 8%, 10% and 17% of MAIN's investment portfolio, which is approaching expectations as of 3/31/2018, 6/30/2018, 9/30/2018 and 12/31/2018, respectively. As mentioned earlier, MAIN's investment portfolio had a modest increase in debt and equity investments that were close to expectations in the fourth quarter of 2018. As of 31 December 2016, this investment assessment had an FMV of $ 419 million.

When combined, I have classified 91%, 92%, 92% and 87% of MAIN's investment portfolio that performs near, on or above expectations as of 3/31/2018, 6/30/2018, 9/30/2018 and 12 / 31/2018, respectively. As such, I believe that a large majority of MAIN's investment portfolio continued to perform near, at or above expectations. However, the proportion of investments showing varying levels of underperformance / lack of performance must still be analyzed / discussed.

Once I have calculated, I have determined 9%, 8%, 8% and 13% of MAIN's investment portfolio experience varying levels of underperformance / non-performance as of 3/31/2018, 6/30/2018, 9 / 30/2018 and 12/31/2018. Compared to the fourteen other BDC groups I currently cover, MAIN still had a fairly low percentage of debt and equity investments that are either performed slightly, modestly or substantially below expectations as of 12/31/2018 (a positive catalyst / trend). To remain infallible, there was a less modest "uptick" within these three lower investment ratings in the fourth quarter of 2018, which is basically "thesis" in this article per se .

To put things in a better perspective, the following was "FMV versus cost ratio" for MAIN and fourteen other BDC colleagues from 12/31/2018 (in order of highest to lowest ratio): 1) NEWTEK Business Services Corp. (NEWT) 1.2174x ; 2) HEAD 1.0815x ; 3) Gladstone Investment Corp. (GAIN) 1.0075x ; 4) Solar Capital Ltd. (SLRC) 1,0047x ; 5) Golub Capital BDC Inc. (GBDC) 1,0014x ; 6) TPG Special Loans (TSLX) 0.9939x ; 7) PennantPark Floating Rate Capital Ltd (PFLT) 0.9871x; 8) Apollo Investment Corp. (OTC: AINV) 0.9791x ; 9) Ares Capital Corp. (ARCC) 0.9736x ; 10) Blackrock (BLK) TCP Capital Corp. (TCPC) 0.9683x ; 11) Prospect Capital Corp. (PSEC) 0.9584x ; 12) FS KKR Capital Corp. (FSK) 0.9524x ; 13) Oaktree (OAK) Strategic Income Corp. (OCSI) 0.9393x ; 14) Oaktree Specialty Lending Corp. (OCSL) 0.9229x ; and 15) Medley (MDLY) Capital Corp. (MCC) 0.9091x.

Investment assessment 3 (Performs slightly below expectations) :

I have classified 4%, 3%, 3% and 5% of MAIN's investment portfolio which is slightly below expectations as of 31.03.2018, 6/30/2018 , 9/30/2018 and 12 / 31/2018, respectively. All debt and equity investments within this classification should be closely monitored quarterly to check for future write-downs of FMV and any possible non-accruals. As of December 31, 2013, this investment assessment had an FMV of $ 124 million. When calculated, this analysis shows that MAIN's investment portfolio had an increased $ 32 million FMV balance over the company's debt and equity investments slightly below expectations in the previous quarters. This weak increase is mainly due to the fact that several debt and equity investments were reclassified from an investment assessment of 2 to an investment assessment of 3 (a negative factor / trend).

Investment assessment 4 (Detailed below the expectations) :

I have classified 2%, 2%, 2% and 4% of MAIN's investment portfolio, which is modestly below expectations as of 31.03.2018, 6 / 30/2018, 9/30/2018, and 12/31/2018, respectively. All debt investments within this classification should be considered for non-accruals. In other words, increased monitoring should occur. Debt and equity investments within this classification also have a modest probability of partial non-recovery of one's remaining principal / cost basis. As of December 31, 2013, this investment rating had an FMV of $ 91 million. When calculating, this analysis shows that MAIN's investment portfolio had an increased FMV balance of USD 51 million if the company's debt and equity investments are modestly below expectations over the previous quarters. The increase is mainly due to the fact that several debt and equity investments were reclassified from an investment rate of 2 or 3 to an investment rating of 4 (a negative factor / trend). The increase in the fourth quarter of 2018 was a little daunting as most of this concerned an increase in credit risk associated with several uncontrolled / non-affiliated portfolio companies.

Investment Assessment 5 (Executable below Expectations) :

Finally, I have classified 3%, 3%, 3% and 4% of MAIN's investment portfolio, which constitutes substantially below expectations as of 3/31/2018, 6/30 / 2018, 9/30/2018 and 12/31/2018, respectively. All debt investments within this classification shall be without status, unless there is a particular reason otherwise (exceptions may occur [and do]). Also, certain debt and equity investments within this classification have a modest high probability of partial non-recovery of one's remaining principal / cost basis (including a possible total depreciation). As of 31/31/2018, this investment rating had an FMV of $ 99 million. When calculating, this analysis shows that MAIN's investment portfolio had an increased FMV balance sheet of USD 34 million if the company's debt and equity investments were significantly below expectations over the previous quarters. Like the trend in investment rating 4, the increase in the fourth quarter of 2018 was a little daunting, as most of this applied to an increase in credit risk associated with several uncontrolled / non-affiliated portfolio companies.

There is never a positive trend when a company has a portion of the investment portfolio within this lowest rating. The following MAIN portfolio companies had debt investments at non-accrual status as of 12/31/2018: 1) Access Media Holdings, LLC (Access Media) ; 2) Datacom, LLC (Datacom) ; 3) MH Corbin Holding LLC (MH Corbin, New Non-Accrual) ; 4) Rocacela, LLC (Rocacela) ; 5) Clarius BIGS, LLC (Clarius) ; and 6) Ospemifene Royalty Sub LLC (Ospemifene).

Readers should understand that any future non-accruals would cause the risk of a reduction in interest income per GAAP (as we saw in the first and fourth quarters of 2018 regarding Access Media and MH Corbin) and the risk of a decline in NAV from future FMV depreciation. In addition, it should be noted that MAIN completed a few debt swaps / restructurings during 2018. This includes Charlotte Russe, Inc. (Charlotte Russe), GST Autoleather, Inc. (GST Autoleather, which was later sold), and Cenveo Corporation (Cenveo ). This usually has a less negative impact on the NII, as the previously earned interest income no longer exists, while the probability of an investment that generates consistent dividend income is low. The recent restructuring of Charlotte Russe and Cenveo now seems to have done very little in terms of "uptick" in operational results (a negative factor / trend).

I believe that debt and equity investments within these lower classifications should still be monitored to a greater extent, as they are most susceptible to write-downs of FMV, default (which will lead to non-accrual) and ultimately a probable partial (in some cases total) loss of principal / cost basis. This will adversely affect MAIN's future sustainable development. This analysis also identifies some portfolio companies that perform above expectations. This provides direct evidence of possible continued net billing. This will positively affect MAIN's future sustainability in NAV. Due to the increase in FMV balances within MAIN's three lower investment ratings (3, 4, and 5) in the fourth quarter of 2018, let's now perform a more "specific" analysis that identifies which portfolio companies have experienced an increase in credit risk.

2) Quarterly FMV analysis on MAIN's portfolio companies:

The next part of this article performs quarterly FMV analysis related to MAIN's portfolio companies during the previous four quarters (12/31 / 2017-12 / 31/2018) . This quarterly FMV percentage analysis shows specific portfolio companies where there was a noticeable change in credit risk. This analysis helps detect recent fluctuations and identifies potentially demanding investments that once performed near, at or above expectations. This analysis also identifies certain previously troubled investments that are now starting to show signs of improvement (when appropriate). Spotting these trends leads to a more accurate depiction of MAIN's future NAV sustainability (forward metric). To begin this analysis, Table 2 is given below.

Table 2 – MAIN Portfolio company FMV Analysis (Investment rating 12/31/2017 – 12/31/2018)

  MAIN Portfolio company FMV Analysis : Table created entirely by myself, including all rating rating classifications) [19659063] Using Table 2 above as a reference, the following MAIN portfolio companies had a remarkable decrease (proportional) or decrease in credit quality over the previous four quarters: 1) MH Corbin ; 2) Quality Lease Service, LLC (Quality Lease) ; 3) American Teleconferencing Services, Ltd. (US teleconference) ; 4) APTIM Corp. ("APTIM") ; 5) Cenveo ; 6) Evergreen Skills Lux S.á r.l. (Evergreen) ; 7) Hydrofarm Holdings LLC (Hydrofarm) ; 8) Pier 1 Imports, Inc. (Pier 1 Import) ; 9) SiTV, LLC ("SiTV") ; and 10) Staples Canada ULC (Staples Canada) . Most valuation decline is about an increase in credit risk. I think this should be seen as a cautionary / negative trend.

As discussed in previous BDC articles, as opposed to what happened in debt market pockets during the third quarter of 2018, pricing experienced modest declines (for example, government-guaranteed investments such as US Treasuries and mortgage-related agency securitisations), loan rates with low credit risk experienced less severe / poorer valuation fluctuations (especially floating loans, lower duration). However, this ratio was completely "reversed rate" during the quarter of the quarter 2018. Government-guaranteed investments experienced a "wave" in prices as volatility on most credit markets "spiked" (rush to safety). Outside this smaller pocket, there was a rapid, sharp reduction in property valuation in most other investment sectors. This includes, but is not limited to, institutional loans / bond loans, high interest capital, large syndicated loans, loan-allocated loans and US shares. MM investments were not "immune" to this trend, either as returns spiked in the quarter (spread was broadened). As returns increase, pricing usually falls (underlying assumptions may ultimately be an increase in credit risk, an indication of recession).

However, I expect a fine "bounce" in valuation of portfolio companies with low credit risk during the first quarter of 2019 (voltage boost, especially in the high interest market). Of course, each BDC portfolio must be monitored / valued separately, but broader market trends should also be considered in terms of investment assessments (level 3 assets per accounting standard coding ("ASC") 820). This should be seen as more of a positive catalyst / trend that will help offset the increase in credit risk within the ten portfolio companies listed in Table 2.

Conclusions drawn:

To summarize what was done in this article , The following two analyzes were given which have a direct impact on MAIN's future sustainable development: 1) an FMV investment assessment of the company's debt and equity investments over the previous four quarters ; and 2) quarterly FMV percentage analysis of specific portfolio companies during the previous four quarters. These analyzes have been, and will probably continue to be, very good forward-looking calculations to consider in terms of MAIN's future NAV sustainability.

When considering the two analyzes performed above, including other factors not mentioned in this specific article, I believe there are relatively strong signs that a minority of MAIN's debt and equity investments are at increased risk of varying levels of net realized / unrealized depreciation of FMV (or non-accrual) in the foreseeable future. In the fourth quarter of 2018, there was an increase in credit risk related to a handful of debt investments, which should be monitored. Most of these investments are classified as uncontrolled / unrelated investments where MAIN's management team has little or no control over underlying operations.

Even with the rally in the sector valuation / pricing in the first quarter of 2019, I would be particularly interested in how the ten portfolio companies listed in Table 2 above are 2019. If credit risk within the majority of these investments is reduced / the valuations increase, i this should be seen as a positive catalyst / trend. However, if further credit deterioration occurs / valuations are further reduced (which is likely to result in non-accrual), I think this should be seen as a negative factor / trend. I think this would strengthen the concept. There are a few new "pants" in MAIN's investment portfolio per se.

But I also believe the continued strong / attractive operating profit within most of MAIN's control / affiliate investments could compensate for potential valuations in the company's underperforming investments. As such, I project the following HEAD quarterly NAV areas over the next quarters:

NAV as of 31.03.2019: $ 24.20 – $ 24.80 per share

NAV per 30.06.2019: $ 24.25 – $ 24.85 per share

NAV as of 9/30/2019: $ 24.35 – $ 24.95 per share

NAV per 12/31/2019: $ 24.35 – $ 24.95 per share

Therefore prepare I currently MAIN will report a minor modest increase in net net sales in 2019 (includes accounts for special periodic dividends). MAIN should also be able to continue to generate attractive "economic returns" (dividends received and change in NAV) in 2019.

MY BUY, SELL or HOLD Recommendation:

MAIN recently closed at $ 38, 44 per share as of 3/15/2019. This was a $ 14.35 per share premium for MAINs NAV as of December 31, 2013 of $ 24.09 per share. This calculates at a price of a NAV ratio of 1,5955 or a premium of 59.55%.

From the analysis listed above, including additional factors not discussed in this article, I currently consider MAIN as a SELL when the company's share price is trading at or higher than a 72.5% premium to the average of MAIN's forecast NAV per share. 3/31/2019 range ($ 24.50 per share), a HOLD when trading over 52.5%, but less than a 72.5% premium to the average of MAIN's projected NAV per 3/31/2019 range, and a PURCHASE when trading at or less than a 52.5% premium to the average of MAIN's projected NAV per 3/31/2019 range. These areas are a minor decline compared to the last MAIN article (about two months ago). This is a direct result of the analysis presented above (included in credit risk for a handful of portfolio companies) and the expected quarterly NII for Q1 2019 compared to the fourth quarter of 2018.

Therefore, I currently consider MAIN as HOLD . As such, I currently believe HEAD is properly appreciated (not overrated, not understated). My current price target for MAIN is about $ 42.45 per share. This is currently the price where my recommendation will change to a SELG. This price target is one ($ 0.75) per share reduction compared to my last MAIN article. The current price at which my recommendation will change to a PURCHASE is approximately $ 37.35 per share. This price is one ($ 0.90) per share reduction compared to my last MAIN article. Langsiktige innehavere av MAIN bør få trøst om at jeg fortsetter å tro at selskapets utbytte bærekraft forblir svært høy i overskuelig fremtid (selv når man vurderer analysen som er gitt ovenfor).

Endelig notat: Hver investors kjøp , SELL eller HOLD-beslutningen er basert på ens risikotoleranse, tidshorisont og utbytteinntektsmål. Min personlige anbefaling passer ikke til hver leserens nåværende investeringsstrategi. Faktiske opplysninger gitt i denne artikkelen er ment å hjelpe til med å hjelpe lesere når det gjelder å investere strategier / beslutninger.

Gjeldende BDC-bransjedisponering:

Den 2/2/2018 gikk jeg inn igjen i MAIN på en veid gjennomsnittlig kjøpesum på $ 37.425 per aksje. Den 2/5/2018 økte jeg min stilling i MAIN til en veid gjennomsnittlig kjøpesum på $ 35.345 per aksje. Mitt andre kjøp var omtrent det tredobbelte beløpet for mitt innledende kjøp. Den 3/1/2018, 10/4/2018, 10/23/2018, 12/18/2018 og 12/21/2018 økte jeg min stilling i MAIN til en veid gjennomsnittlig kjøpesum på $ 35.365, $ 37.645, $ 36.674 , Henholdsvis $ 35,305 og $ 33,045 per aksje. When combined, my MAIN position has a weighted average purchase price of $34.713 per share. This weighted average per share price excludes all dividends received/reinvested. Each MAIN trade was disclosed to readers in real time (that day) via the StockTalks feature of Seeking Alpha.

On 9/6/2017, I re-entered a position in PSEC at a weighted average purchase price of $6.765 per share. On 10/16/2017 and 11/6/2017, I increased my position in PSEC at a weighted average purchase price of $6.285 and $5.66 per share, respectively. When combined, my PSEC position has a weighted average purchase price of $6.077 per share. This weighted average per share price excludes all dividends received/reinvested. Each PSEC trade was disclosed to readers in real time (that day) via the StockTalks feature of Seeking Alpha. I currently have a BUY recommendation on PSEC.

On 6/5/2018, I initiated a position in TSLX at a weighted average purchase price of $18.502 per share. On 6/14/2018, I increased my position in TSLX at a weighted average purchase price of $17.855 per share. My second purchase was approximately double the monetary amount of my initial purchase. When combined, my TSLX position has a weighted average purchase price of $18.071 per share. This weighted average per share price excludes all dividends received/reinvested. Each TSLX trade was disclosed to readers in real time (that day) via the StockTalks feature of Seeking Alpha. I currently have a HOLD recommendation on TSLX.

On 10/12/2018, I initiated a position in ARCC at a weighted average purchase price of $16.40 per share. On 12/10/2018, 12/18/2018, and 12/21/2018, I increased my position in ARCC at a weighted average purchase price of $16.195, $15.305, and $14.924 per share, respectively. When combined, my ARCC position has a weighted average purchase price of $15.293 per share. This weighted average per share price excludes all dividends received/reinvested. Each ARCC trade was disclosed to readers in real time (that day) via the StockTalks feature of Seeking Alpha. I currently have a BUY recommendation on ARCC.

On 10/12/2018, I re-entered a position in NEWT at a weighted average purchase price of $18.355 per share. On 12/21/2018, I increased my position in NEWT at a weighted average purchase price of $15.705 per share, respectively. When combined, my NEWT position has a weighted average purchase price of $16.462 per share. This weighted average per share price excludes all dividends received/reinvested. Each NEWT trade was disclosed to readers in real time (that day) via the StockTalks feature of Seeking Alpha. I currently have a HOLD recommendation on NEWT.

On 10/12/2018, I initiated a position in SLRC at a weighted average purchase price of $20.655 per share. On 12/18/2018, I increased my position in SLRC at a weighted average purchase price of $19.66 per share, respectively. When combined, my SLRC position has a weighted average purchase price of $19.909 per share. This weighted average per share price excludes all dividends received/reinvested. Each SLRC trade was disclosed to readers in real time (that day) via the StockTalks feature of Seeking Alpha. I currently have a BUY recommendation on SLRC.

On 3/13/2019, I initiated a position in GAIN at a weighted average purchase price of $11.625 per share. This weighted average per share price excludes all dividends received/reinvested. This GAIN trade was disclosed to readers in real time (that day) via the StockTalks feature of Seeking Alpha. I currently have a BUY recommendation on GAIN.

All trades/investments I have performed over the past several years have been disclosed to readers in real time (that day at the latest) via the StockTalks feature of Seeking Alpha (which cannot be changed/altered). Through this resource, readers can look up all my prior disclosures (buys/sells) regarding all companies I cover here at Seeking Alpha (see my profile page for a list of all stocks covered). Through StockTalk disclosures, at the end of February 2019, I had an unrealized/realized gain "success rate" of 89.7% and a total return (includes dividends received) success rate of 100% out of 39 total positions (no realized total losses; updated monthly [multiple purchases/sales in one stock count as one overall position until fully closed out]). The minor increase in the first percentage, when compared to January 2019, was due to the fact my re-entered position in Altria Group, Inc. (MO) turned positive. I encourage other Seeking Alpha contributors to provide real time buy and sell updates for their readers which would ultimately lead to greater transparency/credibility.

Disclosure: I am/we are long MAIN, ARCC, BLK, GAIN, MO, NEWT, PSEC, SLRC, TSLX. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I do not receive compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Additional disclosure: I currently have no position in AINV, BDCL, BDCS, BIZD, FSK, GBDC, MCC, MDLY, OAK, OCSI, OCSL, PFLT, or TCPC.


Source link